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Abstract— Multiple applications that execute concurrently
on heterogeneous platforms compete for CPU and network
resources. In this paper we analyze the behavior ofK non-
cooperative schedulers using the optimal strategy that maximize
their efficiency while fairness is ensured at a system level ignoring
applications characteristics. We limit our study to simplesingle-
level master-worker platforms and to the case where each
scheduler is in charge of a single application consisting ofa large
number of independent tasks. The tasks of a given application all
have the same computation and communication requirements,
but these requirements can vary from one application to an-
other. In this context, we assume that each scheduler aims at
maximizing its throughput. We give closed-form formula of the
equilibrium reached by such a system and study its performance.
We characterize the situations where this Nash equilibriumis
optimal (in the Pareto sense) and show that even though no
catastrophic situation (Braess-like paradox) can occur, such an
equilibrium can be arbitrarily bad for any classical perfor mance
measure.
I. I NTRODUCTION
The recent evolutions in computer networks technology, as
well as their diversification, yield to a tremendous change in
the use of these networks: applications and systems can now
be designed at a much larger scale than before. Large-scale
distributed platforms (Grid computing platforms, enterprise
networks, peer-to-peer systems) result from the collaboration
of many people. Thus, the scaling evolution we are facing is
not only dealing with the amount of data and the number
of computers but also with the number of users and the
diversity of their needs and behaviors. Therefore computation
and communication resources have to beefficientlyandfairly
shared between users, otherwise users will leave the group
and join another one. However, the variety of user profiles
requires resource sharing to be ensured at a system level. We
claim that even in a perfect system where every application
competing on a given resource receives the same share and
where no degradation of resource usage (e.g., packet loss
or context switching overhead) occurs when a large number
of applications use a given resource, non-cooperative usage
of the system leads to important application performance
degradation and resource wasting. In this context, we make
the following contributions:
• We present a simple yet realistic situation where a
fair and Pareto-optimalsystem-levelsharing fails to
achieve an efficientapplication-levelsharing. More pre-
cisely, we study the situation where multiple applica-
*The authors would like to thank the University of Tsukuba and the Japan
Society for the Promotion of Science for supporting this work.
tions consisting of large numbers of independent iden-
tical tasks execute concurrently on heterogeneous plat-
forms and compete for CPU and network resources.
SETI@home [1], the Mersenne prime search [2], Cli-
matePrediction.NET [3], Einstein@Home [4], processing
data of the Large Hadron Collider [5] are a few examples
of such typical applications. As the tasks of a given
application all have the same computation and commu-
nication requirements (but these requirements can vary
for different applications), each scheduler aims at max-
imizing its throughput. This framework had previously
been studied in a cooperative centralized framework [6].
In the previous context, at any instant, cooperation led
to a dedication of resources to applications. The system-
level resource sharing aspect was therefore not present
and is extensively described in Section II of the present
paper.
• We characterize in Section II-D the optimal selfish strat-
egy for each scheduler (i.e. the scheduling strategy that
will maximize its own throughput in all circumstances
and adapt to external usage of resources) and pro-
pose equivalent representations of such non-cooperative
schedulers competition (see Section III).
• The particularities of these representations enable us to
characterize the structure of the resulting Nash equilib-
rium as well as closed-form values of the throughput of
each application (see Section III-D).
• Using these closed-form formulas, we derive in Sec-
tion IV a necessary and sufficient condition on the system
parameters (in term of bandwidth, CPU speed, . . . ) for
the non-cooperative equilibrium to be Pareto-optimal.
• We briefly study in Section IV-C the well-known “price
of anarchy” [7]. Unfortunately, this metric does not
enable one to distinguish Pareto optimal points from non-
Pareto optimal ones. That is why we propose an alternate
definition, the “selfishness degradation factor”.
• When studying properties of Nash equilibria, it is im-
portant to know whether paradoxical situations like the
ones exhibited by Braess in his seminal work [8] can
occur. In such situations, the addition of resource (a new
machine, more bandwidth or more computing power in
our framework) can result in a simultaneous degradation
of the performance ofall the users. Such situations only
occur when the equilibrium is not Pareto-optimal, which
may be the case in this framework. We investigate in
Section IV-D whether such situations can occur in our
considered scenario and conclude with a negative answer.
• Last, we show in Section V, that even when the non-
cooperative equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, the throughput
of each application is far from being monotonous with
a resource increase. This enables us to prove that this
equilibrium can be arbitrarily bad for any of the classical
performance measures (average, maximal, and minimum
throughput).
Section VI concludes the paper with a discussion of ex-
tensions of this work and future directions of research. Due
to space requirements, the proofs of the following theorems
and propositions will be omitted in this paper. The interested
reader is referred to [9] for detailed proofs.
II. PLATFORM AND APPLICATION MODELS
A. Platform Model
Our master-worker platform is made ofN + 1 processors
P0, P1, . . . , PN . P0 denotes the master processor, which does
not perform any computation. Each processorPn is charac-
terized by its computing powerWn (in Mflop.s
−1) and the
capacity of its connection with the masterBn (in Mb.s
−1).
Last, we define thecommunication-to-computation ratioCn
of processorPn as Bn/Wn. This model leads us to the
following definition:
Definition 1. We denote by physical-system a triplet
(N, B, W ) whereN is the number of machines, andB and
W the vectors of sizeN containing the link capacities and
the computational powers of the machines.
P0
P1 PNPn
W1 Wn WN
BN
Bn
B1
Fig. 1. Platform model: a single master andN workers
We assume that the platform performs an ideal fair sharing
of resources among the various requests. More precisely, let
us denote byN (B)n (t) (resp.N
(W )
n (t)) the number of ongoing
communication (resp. computation) fromP0 to Pn (resp.
on Pn) at time t. The platform ensures that the amount of
bandwidth received at timet by a communication fromP0 to
Pn is exactlyBn/N
(B)
n (t). Likewise, the amount of processor
power received at timet by a computation onPn is exactly
Wn/N
(W )
n (t). Therefore, the timeT needed to transfer a file
of sizeb from P0 to Pn starting at timet0 is such that
∫ t0+T
t=t0
Bn
N
(B)
n (t)
· dt = b.
Likewise, the timeT needed to perform a computation of size
w on Pn starting at timet0 is such that
∫ t0+T
t=t0
Wn
N
(W )
n (t)
· dt = w.
Last, we assume that communications to different processors
do not interfere. This amounts to say that the network card of
P0 has a sufficiently large bandwidth not to be a bottleneck.
Therefore, a process running onP0 can communicate with
as many processors as it wants. This model is calledmulti-
port [10], [11] and is reasonable when workers are spread
over the Internet, are not too numerous and can make use of
threads to manage communications.
B. Application Model
We considerK applications,Ak, 1 6 k 6 K. Each
application is composed of a large set of independent, same-
size tasks. We can think of eachAk as a bag of tasks, in
which each task is a file that requires some processing. A
task of applicationAk is called a task oftypek. We let wk
be the amount of computation (in Mflop) required to process
a task of typek. Similarly, bk is the size (in Mb) of (the
file associated to) a task of typek. We assume that the only
communication required is outwards from the master, i.e. th
amount of data returned by the worker is negligible. This is
a common hypothesis [12] as in steady-state, the output-file
problem can be reduced to an equivalent problem with bigger
input-files. Last, we define thecommunication-to-computation
ratio ck of tasks of typek asbk/wk. This model leads to the
following definition:
Definition 2. We define auser-system a triplet (K, b, w)
where K is the number of applications, andb and w the
vectors of sizeK representing the size and the amount of
computation associated to the different applications.
C. Global System
In the following ourK applications run on ourN proces-
sors and compete for network and CPU access:
Definition 3. A systemS is a sextuplet(K, b, w, N, B, W ),
with K,b,w,N ,B,W defined as for a user-system and a
physical-system.
We assume that each application is scheduled by its own
scheduler. As each application comprises a very large number
of independent tasks, trying to optimize the makespan is
known to be vainly tedious [13] especially when resource
availability varies over time. Maximizing the throughput of
a single application is however known to be a much more
relevant metric in our context [6], [14]. More formally, fora
given infinite schedule we can definedonek(t) the number
of tasks of typek processed in time interval[0, t]. The
throughput for applicationk of such a schedule is defined
as αk = lim inft→∞
donek(t)
t . Similarly we can defineαn,k
the average number of tasks of typek performed per time-
unit on the processorPn. αk and αn,k are linked by the
following linear equationαk =
∑
n αn,k. The scheduler of
each application thus aims at maximizing its own throughput,
i.e. αk. However, as the applications are sharing the same set
of resources, we have the following general constraints1:
Computation ∀n ∈ J0, NK :
∑K
k=1 αn,k · wk 6 Wn (1a)
1The notationJa, bK denotes the set of integers comprised betweena and
b, i.e. Ja, bK = N ∩ [a, b].
Communication ∀n ∈ J1, NK :
∑K
k=1 αn,k · bk 6 Bn (1b)
These constraints enable to define upper-bounds on the
throughput of any schedule. Moreover, aperiodic schedule—
one that begins and ends in exactly the same state — (we refer
the interested reader to [15] for more details) can be built from
any valid values for theαk andαn,k such that its throughput
for all applicationsk is exactlyαk = limt→∞
donek(t)
t . When
the number of tasks per application is large, this approach
has the advantage of avoiding the NP-completeness of the
makespan optimization problem. This further allows to only
focus on the average steady-state values.
Remark1. Consider a system withK applications running
over N machines. The set of achievable utilities, that is to
say the set of possible throughputαk is given by
U(S) =



(αk)16k6K
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
∃α1,1, . . . , αN,K ,
∀k ∈ J1, KK :
∑N
n=1 αn,k = αk
∀n ∈ J1, NK :
∑K
k=1 αn,k · wk 6 Wn
∀n ∈ J1, NK :
∑K
k=1 αn,k · bk 6 Bn
∀n ∈ J1, NK, ∀k ∈ J1, KK : αn,k > 0



.
The utility set is hence convex and compact.
D. A Non-Cooperative Game
We first study the situation where only one application
is scheduled on the platform. This will enable us to simply
define the scheduling strategy that will be used by each player
(scheduler) in the more general case where many applications
are considered. When there is only one application, our
problem reduces to the following linear program:
MAXIMIZE
∑N
n=1 αn,1 UNDER THE CONSTRAINTS


(1a) ∀n ∈ J0, NK : αn,1 · w1 6 Wn
(1b) ∀n ∈ J1, NK : αn,1 · b1 6 Bn
(1c) ∀n, αn,1 > 0.
We can easily show that the optimal solution to this linear
program is obtained by setting∀n, αn,1 = min
(
Wn
w ,
Bn
b
)
.
In a practical setting, this amounts to say that the master
process will saturate each worker by sending it as many tasks
as possible. On a stable platformWn and Bn can easily be
measured and theαn,1’s can thus easily be computed. On
an unstable one this may be more tricky. However a simple
acknowledgment mechanism enables the master process to
ensure that it is not over-flooding the workers, while always
converging to the optimal throughput.
In a multiple-applications context, each player (process)
strives to optimize its own performance measure (considered
here to be its throughputαk) regardless of the strategies of the
other players. Hence, in this scenario, each process constantly
floods the workers while ensuring that all the tasks it sends are
performed (e.g., using an acknowledgment mechanism). This
adaptive strategy automatically cope with other schedulers
usage of resource andselfishlymaximize the throughput of
each application2. As the players constantly adapt to each
others’ actions, they may (or not) reach some equilibrium,
2We suppose a purely non-cooperative game where no schedulerdecides
to “ally” to any other (i.e. no coalition is formed).
known in game theory asNash equilibrium[16], [17]. In the
remaining of this paper, we will denote byα(nc)n,k the rates
achieved at such stable states.
E. A simple example
Consider a system with two computers1 and 2, with
parametersB1 = 1, W1 = 2, B2 = 2, W2 = 1 and two
applications of parametersb1 = 1, w1 = 2, b2 = 2 and
w2 = 1. If the applications were collaborating such that
application1 was processed exclusively to computer1 and
application2 in computer2 (see Figure 2(a)), their respective
throughput would be
α
(coop)
1 = α
(coop)
2 = 1.
Yet, with the non-cooperative approach (see Figure 2(b)), one
can check that they only get a throughput of (the formal proof
will be given in Theorem 1):
α
(nc)
1 = α
(nc)
2 =
3
4
time time
time time
Communication Computation
S
la
ve
1
S
la
ve
2
(a) With cooperation
time time
time time
Communication Computation
S
la
ve
1
S
la
ve
2
(b) Non-cooperative equilibrium.
Fig. 2. Non-cooperation can lead to inefficiencies.
In this example, one can easily check that, at the Nash
equilibrium, for any worker, there is no resource waste: slave 1
(resp. slave 2) is communication (resp. computation) saturated
i.e. equation (1b) (resp. equation (1a)) is an equality. However,
communication-saturation implies computation idle timesand
vice-versa. Yet, when communication and computation idle
times cohexist in a system, the non-cooperative behavior of
the applications can lead to important inefficiencies, which
we investigate further in the remaining of this paper.
III. M ATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
In this section, we mathematically formulate the use of
resources in the system. As in the multi-port model com-
munication resources are all independent, we can study each
worker separately. Hence, in this section, we study the use of
resources on an arbitrary workern of the system.
In a steady state, actions of the players will interfere on
each resource in (a priori) a non predictable order and the
resource usage may be arbitrarily complex (see Figure 3(a)).
We hence propose in this section “equivalent” representations
(in the sense that they conserve the throughput of each
application on the considered worker) that will enable us to
conclude this section with a closed-form expression of the
(αn,k)16n6N
16k6K
.
First note that for any given subsetK of J1, KK, we can
define the fraction of time where all players ofK (and only
them) use a given resource. This enables us to reorganize the
schedule into an equivalent representation (see Figure 3(b))
with at most 2|K| time intervals (the number of possible
choices for the subsetK). In this representation, the frac-
tions of time spent using a given resource (which can be a
communication link or a processor) are perfectly equal to the
ones in the original schedule. However such a representatio
is still too complex (2|K| is a large value). Hence, we
now explain how to build two more compact “equivalent”
canonical representations (see Figure 3(c) and 3(d)).
A. Sequential Canonical Representation
The first compact form we define is calledsequential
canonical representation(see Figure 3(c)). If the schedulers
were sending data one after the other on this link, the
kth scheduler would have to communicate during exactly
τ
(B,seq)
n,k =
α
(nc)
n,k
bk
Bn
of the time to send the same amount
of data as in the original scheduler. This value is called
sequential communication time ratio. Similarly, we can define
the sequential computation time ratioτ (W,seq)n,k as
α
(nc)
n,k
wk
Wn
.
We hence have the following relation betweenτ (B,seq)n,k and
τ
(W,seq)
n,k :
τ
(B,seq)
n,k =
ck
Cn
τ
(W,seq)
n,k . (2)
We can therefore obtain a canonical schedule (see Figure 3(c))
with at mostK +1 intervals whose respective sets of players
are {1}, {2}, . . . , {K}, ∅. This communication scheme is
thus called sequential canonical representation and has the
sameα(nc)n,k values as the original schedule. However, com-
munication and computation times have all been decreased as
each scheduler is now using the network link and the CPU
exclusively. We will see later that this information loss does
not matter for multi-port schedulers.
B. Parallel Canonical Representation
The second compact form we define is calledparallel
canonical representation(see Figure 3(d)). In this scheme,
resource usage is as conflicting as possible. Let us denote by
τ
(B,par)
n,k (resp.τ
(W,par)
n,k ) the fraction of time spent by player
k to communicate withPn (resp. to compute onPn) in such
a configuration.τ (B,par)n,k is the parallel communication time
ratio andτ (W,par)n,k is theparallel computation time ratio. We
can easily prove that such representation is unique (see the
extended version [9]) and we can therefore obtain a canonical
schedule (see Figure 3(d)) with at mostK + 1 intervals
whose respective player sets are{1, . . . , K}, {2, . . . , K}, . . . ,
{K}, and ∅. This communication scheme is called parallel
canonical representation and has the sameα(nc)n,k values as
the original schedule. However, communication times have
all been increased as each scheduler is now interfering with
as many other schedulers as possible.
C. Particularities of Multi-port Selfish Schedulers
The same reasonings can be applied to computation re-
sources and therefore, for a given worker, both communication
and computation resources can be put in any of these two
canonical forms (see Figure 4(a)).
τ
(B,par)
n,2τ
(B,par)
n,3 τ
(W,par)
n,2τ
(W,par)
n,3
τ
(B,par)
n,4 τ
(W,par)
n,4 τ
(W,par)
n,1τ
(B,par)
n,1 0
Communication Computation
0
(a) Parallel canonical form of an arbitrary schedule
τ
(B,par)
n,2τ
(B,par)
n,3 τ
(W,par)
n,2τ
(W,par)
n,3
τ
(B,par)
n,4 τ
(W,par)
n,4 τ
(W,par)
n,1τ
(B,par)
n,1 0
Communication Computation
0
(b) Parallel canonical schedule for a given processor underthe non-
cooperative assumption. Application 3 (blue) and 4 (red) are com-
munication saturated: they receive the same amount of bandwidth.
Application 1 (green) and 2 (yellow) arecomputation saturated: they
receive the same amount of CPU.
Fig. 4. Parallel canonical schedules
As we have seen in Section II-D, the scheduling algorithm
used by the players consists in constantly flooding work-
ers. Hence it is impossible that bothτ (B,par)n,k and τ
(W,par)
n,k
are smaller than 1. A playerk is thus said to be either
communication-saturatedon worker n (τ (B,par)n,k = 1) or
computation-saturatedon workern (τ (W,par)n,k = 1).
Proposition 1. If there is a communication-saturated appli-
cation then
∑K
k=1 τ
(B,seq)
n,k = 1. Similarly, if there is a
computation-saturated application then
∑K
k=1 τ
(W,seq)
n,k = 1.
As two computation-saturated playersk1 and k2 receive
the same amount of computation power and compute during
the same amount of time, we haveα(nc)n,k1wk1 = α
(nc)
n,k2
wk2 .
Thereforeck1 6 ck2 implies α
(nc)
n,k1
bk1 6 α
(nc)
n,k2
bk2 , hence
τ
(B,par)
n,k1
6 τ
(B,par)
n,k2
and τ (B,seq)n,k1 6 τ
(B,seq)
n,k2
. The same
reasoning holds for two communication-saturated players as
well as for a mixture of both. As a consequence, in a
multi-port setting, players should be first sorted according to
their ck to build the canonical schedule. The very particular
structure of this schedule (see Figure 4(b)) will enable us
in the following section to give closed-form formula for the
α
(nc)
n,k . All these remarks can be summarized in the following
proposition:
3
2
1
0 1
time
Resource Usage
(a) Complex arbitrary schedule
0 1
time
Resource Usage
(b) Sorted schedule
τ
(B,seq)
n,2 τ
(B,seq)
n,3τ
(B,seq)
n,1
0 1
time
Resource Usage
(c) Sequential canonical repre-
sentation: areas are preserved
but using times are minimized
∆τ
(B,par)
n,1 ∆τ
(B,par)
n,2 ∆τ
(B,par)
n,3
τ
(B,par)
n,1
τ
(B,par)
n,2
τ
(B,par)
n,3
0 1
time
Resource Usage
(d) Parallel canonical represen-
tation: areas are preserved but
using times are maximized
Fig. 3. Various schedule representations. Each application is associated to a color: Application 1 is green, application 2 is yellow and application 3 is blue.
The area associated to each application is preserved throughout all transformations.
Proposition2. Let us consider an equilibrium and denote by
Bn the set of communication-saturated applications on worker
n and byWn the set of computation-saturated applications
on workern. If c1 6 c2 6 · · · 6 cK , then there existsm ∈
J0, KK such thatWn = J1, mK andBn = Jm + 1, KK. We
have:
• Sequential representation: Communications:
τ
(B,seq)
n,1 6 · · · 6 τ
(B,seq)
n,m <
Bn︷ ︸︸ ︷
τ
(B,seq)
n,m+1 = · · · = τ
(B,seq)
n,K ¡ 1
Computations:
1 > τ
(W,seq)
n,1 = · · · = τ
(W,seq)
n,m︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wn
> τ
(W,seq)
n,m+1 > · · · > τ
(W,seq)
n,K
• Parallel representation: Communications:
τ
(B,par)
n,1 6 · · · 6 τ
(B,par)
n,m <
Bn︷ ︸︸ ︷
τ
(B,par)
n,m+1 = · · · = τ
(B,par)
n,K = 1
Computations:
1 = τ
(W,par)
n,1 = · · · = τ
(W,par)
n,m︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wn
> τ
(W,par)
n,m+1 > · · · > τ
(W,par)
n,K
D. Closed-form Solution of the Equations
The closed-form solutions of the equilibrium are defined by
Theorem 1. Its complete proof, as well as the proofs of the
other propositions and theorems presented in the remaining
of this paper can be found in the extended version [9].
Theorem1. We assumec1 6 c2 6 · · · 6 cK . Let us denote
by Wn the set of players that are computation-saturated and
by Bn the set of players that are communication-saturated on
a given arbitrary workern.
1) If
∑
k
Cn
ck
6 K thenWn = ∅ and
∀k, α
(nc)
n,k =
Bn
K.bk
.
2) Else, if
∑
k
ck
Cn
6 K thenBn = ∅ and
∀k, α
(nc)
n,k =
Wn
K.wk
.
3) Else, Bn and Wn are non-empty and there exists an
integerm ∈ J1; K − 1K such that
cm
Cn
<
m −
∑m
k=1
ck
Cn
K − m −
∑K
k=m+1
Cn
ck
<
cm+1
Cn
.
Then, we haveWn = {1, . . . , m} and Bn = {m +
1, . . . , K} and



α
(nc)
n,k =
Bn
bk
|Wn|−
∑
p∈Wn
cp
Cn
|Wn||Bn|−
∑
p∈Wn
cp
∑
p∈Bn
1
cp
if k ∈ Bn
α
(nc)
n,k =
Wn
wk
|Bn|−
∑
p∈Bn
Cn
cp
|Wn||Bn|−
∑
p∈Wn
cp
∑
p∈Bn
1
cp
if k ∈ Wn
(3)
Sketch of the proof.If Bn = ∅, then all applications use the
CPU of Pn at any instant. Therefore they all receive the
exact same amount of CPU, i.e.Wn/K. Hence we have
α
(nc)
n,k =
Wn
K.wk
. Moreover,∀k, τ (W,seq)n,k = 1/K and from (2)
we have1 >
∑
k τ
(B,seq)
n,k =
∑
k
ck
Cn
τ
(W,seq)
n,k =
∑
k
ck
KCn
.
Hence
∑
k
Cn
ck
6 K. The caseWn = ∅ is similar.
Let us now focus on the more interesting case where both
Bn 6= ∅ and Wn 6= ∅. Using the definition of sequential
communication and computation times, we have:
{∑
p∈Bn
τ
(B,seq)
n,p +
∑
p∈Wn
τ
(B,seq)
n,p = 1∑
p∈Bn
τ
(W,seq)
n,p +
∑
p∈Wn
τ
(W,seq)
n,p = 1
(4)
Two applications fromBn communicate all the time. There-
fore they send the exact same amount of data that we denote
by τ (B)B : ∀k ∈ Bn, α
(nc)
n,k
Bn
bk
= τ
(B,seq)
n,k = τ
(B)
B . Similarly,
we get∀k ∈ Wn, α
(nc)
n,k
Wn
wk
= τ
(W,seq)
n,k = τ
(W )
W . From these
relations and from (2), system (4) can be written:
{
|Bn|τ
(B)
B + τ
(W )
W
∑
p∈Wn
cp
Cn
= 1
|Wn|τ
(W )
W + τ
(B)
B
∑
p∈Bn
Cn
cp
= 1
which can be easily solved to get (3).
Let m such thatm ∈ Bn andm + 1 ∈ Wn. From (2) and
(3) and Proposition 2, we can write:
cm+1
Cn
=
τ
(B,seq)
n,m+1
τ
(W,seq)
n,m+1
>
τ
(B,seq)
n,m+1
τ
(W,seq)
n,m
=
m −
∑m
k=1
ck
Cn
K − m −
∑K
k=m+1
Cn
ck
and
cm
Cn
=
τ
(B,seq)
n,m
τ
(W,seq)
n,m
<
τ
(B,seq)
n,m+1
τ
(W,seq)
n,m
=
m −
∑m
k=1
ck
Cn
K − m −
∑K
k=m+1
Cn
ck
which leads to the condition onm. The reciprocity of the
conditions on the sets relies on the application of the following
technical result withγk = ck/Cn.
Let γ1 < · · · < γK be K positive numbers. We have:
1) If
∑
k 1/γk 6 K then
∑
k γk > K;
2) If
∑
k γk 6 K then
∑
k 1/γk > K;
3) If
∑
k γk > K and
∑
k 1/γk > K, then there exists
exactly onem ∈ J1, KK such that:
γm <
∑m
k=1 1 − γk∑K
k=m+1 1 −
1
γk
< γm+1.
Corollary 1. From these equations, we see that there always
exists exactly one non-cooperative equilibrium.
IV. I NEFFICIENCIES ANDPARADOXES
In this section, we study the inefficiencies of the Nash
equilibria, in the Pareto sense, and their consequences. Let
us start by recalling the definition of the Pareto optimality.
Definition 4 (Pareto optimality). Let G be a game withK
players. Each of them is defined by a set of possible strategies
Sk and utility functionsuk defined onS1 × · · · × SK .3
A vector of strategy is said to be Pareto optimal if it
is impossible to strictly increase the utility of a player
without strictly decreasing the one of another. In other words,
(s1, . . . , sK) ∈ S1×· · ·×SK is Pareto optimal if and only if:
∀(s∗1, . . . , s
∗
K) ∈ S1 × · · · × SK ,
∃i, ui(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
K) > ui(s1, . . . , sK) ⇒
∃j, uj(s
∗
1, . . . , s
∗
K) < uj(s1, . . . , sK).
We recall that, in the considered system, the utility func-
tions are theαk, that is to say, the average number of tasks
of applicationk processed per time-unit, while the strategies
are the scheduling algorithms (i.e. which resources to use and
when to use them).
In this section, we comment on the efficiency of the Nash
equilibrium, in the case of a single worker (Section IV-A), and
then of multiple workers (IV-B) and propose in Section IV-
C a brief study of the well-known “price of anarchy”. Un-
fortunately, this metric does not enable to distinguish Pareto
optimal points from non-Pareto optimal ones. That is why we
also propose an alternate definition, the “s lfishness degrada-
tion factor”. Last, it is known that when Nash equilibria are
inefficient, some paradoxical phenomenon can occur (see, for
instance [8]). We hence study in Section IV-D, the occurrence
of Braess paradox in this system.
A. Single Processor
We can show that when the players (here the applications)
compete in a non-cooperative way over a single processor, the
resulting Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal (see the extended
version [9] for a detailed proof).
Proposition3. On a single-processor system, the allocation
at the Nash equilibrium is Pareto optimal.
3Note that the utility of a player depends on its own strategy and on the
strategies of all the other players.
B. Multi-processors and Inefficiencies
Interestingly, although the Nash equilibria are Pareto op-
timal on any single-worker system, we show in this section
that these equilibria are not always Pareto optimal for a system
consisting of several processors.
We first exhibit this phenomenon on a simple example
consisting of two machines and two applications (Section IV-
B.1). We then provide a very simple characterization of the
systems under which the non-cooperative competition leads
to inefficiencies (Section IV-B.2).
1) Example of Pareto inefficiency:The Pareto optimality
is a global notion. Hence, although for each single-processor
system, the allocation is Pareto optimal, the result may not
hold for an arbitrary number of machines. This phenomenon
was illustrated in Section II-E.
2) Necessary and sufficient condition:We prove in [9] the
following very simple characterization of the systems under
which the non-cooperative competition leads to inefficiencs.
Theorem2. Consider a systemS = (K, b, w, N, B, W ) as
defined in Definition 3. Suppose that the applications are not
all identical, that is to say that there existsk1 and k2 such
that ck1 < ck2 .
Then, the allocation at the Nash equilibrium is Pareto
inefficient if and only if there exists two workers, namely
n1 andn2 such thatWn1 = ∅ andBn2 = ∅.
C. Measuring Pareto Inefficiency
We have seen that the Nash equilibrium of the system can
be Pareto inefficient. A natural question is then “how much
inefficient is it?”. Unfortunately, measuring Pareto inefficiency
is still an open question. It is hence the focus of this section.
1) Definitions: Papadimitriou [7] introduced the now pop-
ular measure “price of anarchy” that we will study in this
section.
Let us consider an efficiency measuref on the αk. For
a given systemS (i.e. platform parameters along with the
description of ourK applications), we denote byα(nc)k (S), the
rates achieved on systemS by the non-cooperative algorithm.
For any given metricf , let
(
α
(f)
k (S)
)
16k6K
be a vector
of optimal rates on systemS for the metricf . We define
the inefficiencyIf (S) of the non-cooperative allocation for a
given metric and a given system as
If (S) =
f
(
α
(f)
1 (S), . . . , α
(f)
K (S)
)
f
(
(α
(nc)
1 (S), . . . , α
(nc)
K (S)
) > 1.
Papadimitriou focuses on the profit metricΣ defined by
Σ(α1, . . . , αK) =
1
K
∑K
k=1 αk. The price of anarchyφΣ is
then be defined as the largest inefficiency:
φΣ = max
S
IΣ(S) = max
S
∑
k α
(Σ)
k (S)∑
k α
(nc)
k (S)
> 1.
2) Studying the Price of Anarchy on a simple example:
Let us consider the following simple systemSM,K defined
by N = 1, B1 =1, W1 =1, b = ( 1M , 1, . . . , 1), and
w = ( 1M , 1, . . . , 1). It is then easy to compute the following
allocations (see Figure 5):
Utility Set
Nash Equilibrium
Profit Allocation
Max-min Allocation
α1
00
1
K−1
αk
M
1
Fig. 5. Utility set and allocations forSM,K (K = 3,M = 2).
• α(nc)(SM,K) =
(
M
K ,
1
K , . . . ,
1
K
)
corresponds to the non-
cooperative allocation;
• α(Σ)(SM,K) = (M, 0, . . . , 0) corresponds to the alloca-
tion optimizing the average throughput;
• α(min)(SM,K) =
(
1
K−1+1/M , . . . ,
1
K−1+1/M
)
corre-
sponds to the max-min fair allocation [18];
• α(Π)(SM,K) =
(
M
K ,
1
K , . . . ,
1
K
)
corresponds to the pro-
portionally fair allocation which is a particular Nash
Bargaining Solution [18]. Surprisingly, on this instance,
this allocation also corresponds to the non-cooperative
one.
Note that, α(Σ), α(min), and α(Π) are Pareto optimal by
definition. One can easily compute
IΣ(SM,K) =
M
M
K +
K−1
K
−−−−→
M→∞
K.
The price of anarchy is therefore unbounded. However, the
fact that the non-cooperative equilibria of such instances
are Pareto-optimal and have interesting properties of fairness
(they correspond to a Nash Bargaining Solution [18]) ques-
tions the relevance of theprice of anarchynotion as a Pareto
efficiency measure.
Likewise, the inefficiency of the max-min fair allocation is
equivalent toM for large values ofM (as opposed toK for
the non-cooperative equilibrium). It can hence be unbounded
even for bounded number of applications and machines. This
seems even more surprising as such points generally result
from complex cooperations and are hence Pareto optimal.
These remarks raise once more the question of the measure
of Pareto inefficiency.
3) Selfishness Degradation Factor:The previous problems
are not specific to the efficiency measureΣ. The same kind
of behavior can be exhibited when using themin or the
product of the throughputs. That is why we think that Pareto
inefficiency should be measured as thedistanceto the Pareto
border and not to a specific point.
Based on the definition of the Pareto optimality, one can
define the concept of strict Pareto-superiority.
Definition 5 (Pareto-superiority). A utility point α is said
strictly Pareto-superiorto a pointβ if for all player k we
haveαk > βk.
Obviously, a Pareto-optimal point is such that there is no
achievable point strictly Pareto-superior to it. To quantify the
degradation of Braess-like Paradoxes (the degree of Paradox),
Kameda [19] introduced the Pareto-comparison ofα and
β as ̺(α, β) = mink
αk
βk
. Therefore,α is strictly superior
to β iff ̺(α, β) > 1. Intuitively ̺ represents the perfor-
mance degradation betweenα and β. Using this definition,
we propose the following definition of Pareto inefficiency:
I(S) = maxα∈U(S) ̺(α, α
(nc)(S)). Thereforeα(nc)(S) is
Pareto inefficient as soon asI(S) > 1 and the larger
maxα I(α, α
(nc)), the more inefficient the Nash equilibrium.
The selfishness degradation factorcan then be defined as
φ = max
S
I(S) = max
S
max
α∈U(S)
min
k
αk
α
(nc)
n,k (S)
.
A system (e.g., queuing network, transportation network,
load-balancing, ...) that would be such that the Nash equi-
libria are always Pareto optimal would have a selfishness
degradation factor equal to one. The selfishness degradation
factor may however be unbounded on systems where non-
cooperative equilibria are particularly inefficient. The rle-
vance of this definition is corroborated by the fact thatε-
approximations of Pareto-sets defined by Yannakakis and
Papadimitriou [20] have a degradation factor of1 + ε. It can
easily be shown that the systems studied in this article have
a selfishness degradation factor larger than two but the exact
value remains an open problem.
D. Braess-like Paradoxes
When studying properties of Nash equilibria in routing
systems, Braess exhibited an example in which, by adding
resource to the system (in his example, a route), the perfor-
mance of all the users were degraded [8]. We investigate in
this section whether such situations can occur in our scenario.
Let us consider a system (called “initial”) and a second one
(referred to as the “augmented” system), derived from the first
one by adding some quantity of resource. Intuitively, the Nash
equilibrium aug in the augmented system should be Pareto-
superior to the one in the initial systemini. We say that a
Braess paradox happens whenini is strictly Pareto-superior
to point aug.
Obviously, every achievable state in the initial system is
also achievable in the augmented system. Hence ifa is an
achievable point in the initial system and ifb is a Pareto
optimal point is the augmented one, thena cannot be strictly
Pareto superior tob. Hence Braess paradoxes are conse-
quences of the Pareto inefficiencies of the Nash equilibria.
We show that, even though the Nash equilibria may be
Pareto inefficient, in the considered scenario, Braess para-
doxes cannot occur.
Theorem 3. In the non-cooperative multi-port scheduling
problem, Braess like paradoxes cannot occur.
Sketch of the proof.We first need to introduce the defi-
nition of equivalent subsystem. Consider a systemS =
(K, b, w, N, B, W). We define the new subsystem̃S =
(K, b, w, N, B̃, W̃) by: for each workern,
W̃n =
{∑
k
Bn
Kck
if Wn = ∅,
Wn otherwise,
and B̃n =
{∑
k
Wnck
K if Bn = ∅,
Bn otherwise.
We now precise whỹS is said to be an equivalent subsystem
of S. Consider a systemS = (K, b, w, N, B, W) and its Nash
equilibrium α(nc). One can check that:
i) The systemS̃ is a subsystem ofS, i.e. for all workern:
B̃n 6 Bn andW̃n 6 Wn.
ii) The Nash equilibriumα̃(nc) of the subsystem̃S verifies
∀n, ∀k, α
(nc)
n,k = α̃
(nc)
n,k .
iii) The Nash equilibrium̃α(nc) of the subsystem̃S is Pareto-
optimal.
The conclusion of the proof relies on the following result:
Consider two systemsS = (K, b, w, N, B, W) and S′ =
(K, b, w, N, B′, W ′) and their respective equivalent subsys-
temsS̃ = (K, b, w, N, B̃, W̃) andS̃′ = (K, b, w, N, B̃′, W̃ ′).
Suppose that∀n, B′n > Bn andW
′
n > Wn then ∀n, B̃
′
n >
B̃n andW̃ ′n > W̃n.
V. PERFORMANCEMEASURES
In this section we show that unexpected behavior of some
typical performance measures can occur even for Pareto
optimal situations. To ensure optimality of the Nash equilib-
rium, we consider applications running on a single processor
(Proposition 3).
We recall that the Pareto optimality is a global performance
measure. Hence, it is possible that, while the resources of
the system increase (either by the adding of capacity to a
link or of computational capabilities to a processor), a given
performance measure decreases while the equilibrium remains
Pareto optimal. The aim of this section is to illustrate this
phenomenon on some typical performance measures.
More precisely, we show the non-monotonicity of the maxi-
mal throughput, of the minimal throughput and of the average
throughput. We finally end this section with a numerical
example where these measures decrease simultaneously with
the increase of the resource.
A. Lower Bound on the Maximal Degradation
In the following, we suppose that only one of the resource
of the system increases. By symmetry, we suppose that
the computational capacity (W1) is constant, while the link
capacityB1 increases.4
Let us introduceB = WK/
∑
k
1
ck
and B = WK
∑
k ck.
From Theorem 1, when considering the equations at the Nash
equilibrium, we can distinguish3 cases:
• 2 “saturated” situations that are:
satWn If B 6 B, then α
(nc)
k =
B
K.bk
, i.e. the
throughput of each application is proportional toB.
satBn If B > B then α
(nc)
k =
W
K.wk
, i.e. the
throughput of each application is constant with respect
with B.
• 1 “continuous” situation whenB < B < B
Obviously, in the “saturated” situations, the throughput
α
(nc)
k are increasing or constant and the order between the
applications is preserved. (I.e. if forB 6 B (resp.B > B),
4In the following, we will omit the subscript “1” as only one worker is
considered in the system.
α
(nc)
k1
6 α
(nc)
k2
then for all B′ 6 B (resp.B′ > B) we have
α
(nc)
k1
6 α
(nc)
k2
.)
To simplify the analysis, we consider the degradation
obtained whenB = B compared to the situation where
B = B. It is hence a lower bound on the actual maximum
achievable degradation.
Consider an arbitrary applicationk. We write α(nc)k before
(resp. α(nc)k after) the value of its throughput whenB = B
(resp.B = B). Hence,α(nc)k before =
B
Kbk
= W
bk
∑
p
1
cp
and
α
(nc)
k after =
W
Kwk
.
Remark 2. Note that
α
(nc)
n,k before
α
(nc)
n,k after
= Kck
∑
p
1/cp
. The lower
bound on the degradation is hence proportional to1/ck and
is therefore maximal for the application with the smallest
coefficientck. For instance, if∀p 6= k, cp = K and ck = 1,
then αbeforeαafter ∼ K/2. Hence, when the number of applications
grows to infinity, the degradation of the application having
the smallerck also grows to infinity.
We can now easily show that even in a single processor
system, the maximal (and minimal) throughput can strictly
decrease with the adding of resource. Note that:
• if Bn 6 B the applicationk having the highest (resp.
smallest) throughputα(nc)n,k is the one having the smallest
(resp. highest) value ofbk.
• if B > B the applicationk having the highest (resp.
smallest) throughputα(nc)n,k is the one whosewk is the
smallest (resp. highest).
Hence, a lower bound on the maximal degradation of the
maximal (resp. minimal) throughput is K∑
k 1/ck
mink wk
mink bk
(resp.
K∑
k
1/ck
maxk wk
maxk bk
). Therefore, for appropriate choices of
mink bk and mink wk (for all ck fixed), the degradation can
be chosen arbitrarily large.
Finally, note that
∑
k
α
(nc)
n,k before∑
k α
(nc)
n,k after
= K∑
k
1/ck
·
∑
k
1/bk∑
k
1/wk
. Hence,
for some combinations ofwk, bk and ck, the degradation of
the average throughput can be arbitrarily large (e.g., forw =
(1, 1/ε, . . . , 1/ε) and b = (1, 1/ε2, . . . , 1/ε2), we get a ratio
of K 1+(K−1)ε
2
(1+(K−1)ε)2 −−−→ε→0
K).
B. Numerical Example
We end this section with an example in which all the perfor-
mance measures we considered are simultaneously degraded
when the bandwidthB of the link connecting the master to
the worker is increased.
Consider the example represented in Fig. 6. Observe that
when the bandwidthB is 245/24 ≃ 10.208 the three measures
(namely the higher throughput, the lower throughput and
the average throughput) have lower values than when the
bandwidthB is only equal to560/73 ≃ 7.671.
As mink wk = w4 andmink bk = b4, then the application
having the higher throughput in bothsatBn and satWn is
application4, and a lower bound of the degradation is112/73.
As maxk wk = w3 andmax bk = b1, then the application
having the lower throughput is application3 in satBn and
application1 in satWn, and a lower bound of the degradation
is 84/73.
0
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0.6
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1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2 4 6 8 10 12
α1
α2
α3
α41
K
∑
k αk
α
(nc)
n,k
Bn
Fig. 6. The three performance measures can simultaneously decrease with
the resource:b = { 8,5,7,1}, w = { 4,5,12,2}, K=4, W =10.
Finally, a lower bound of the degradation of the average
performance is2466/2263.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have presented a simple yet realistic situation where a
fair and Pareto-optimalsystem-levelsharing fails to achieve
an efficientapplication-levelsharing. Even though the system
achieves a perfect sharing of resources between applications,
the non-cooperative usage of the system leads to important
application performance degradation and resource wasting.
We have proved the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium in our framework and extensively studied its pro -
erty. Surprisingly, the equilibrium is Pareto-optimal on each
worker independently. However, it may not be globally Pareto-
optimal. We have proved that no Braess-like paradoxical
situations could occur, which is, to the best of our knowledge,
the first situation where Pareto-inefficient non-cooperative
equilibrium cannot lead to Braess-like paradox. However,
some seemingly paradoxical situations can occur. Indeed, ev n
when the equilibria are Pareto optimal, their performance can
be arbitrarily bad for any classical performance measure.
This study led us to the natural question of the inefficency
measure. After briefly commenting on the notion of “price
of anarchy”, we proposed a new definition, called SDF
(Selfishness Degradation Factor).
The key hypothesis for deriving a closed-form descrip-
tion of the equilibria is the multi-port hypothesis. Under
this hypothesis, some time information could be lost when
using equivalent representations, which resulted in simpler
equations than if a 1-port model had been used (i.e. if the
master can communicate with only one worker at a given
instant). Preliminary simulations with this model show that
Braess-like paradoxes may occur. The understanding of such
phenomena are crucial to large-scale system planing and
development as there is no way to predict their apparition so
far. Analytical characterizations of such a framework could
provide significant insights on the key ingredients necessary
to the occurrence of Braess-like paradoxes.
Last, we can conclude from this study that cooperation
between applications is essential to avoid inefficiencies (even
for simple applications constituted of a huge number of
independent identical tasks). As far as the framework of this
article is concerned, some steps in this direction have been
given in [6] where some distributed algorithms were proposed
and compared to an optimal but centralized one. However, in
their work, there was a single scheduler whose duty was to
achieve the best throughput for all applications while ensuri g
a max-min fair share. In a fully-decentralized setting, as
considered in the present article, some form of cooperation
(e.g., similar to the one proposed by [21] for elastic trafficin
broadband networks) between different schedulers should be
designed.
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